complains that the phrase "know thyself" is "often torn completely out of the complex of ideas to which it belongs and for some time now has been vagabonding in literature unchallenged" (CI 177/SKS1 224). Rather than the phrase being about "subjectivity in its fullness, inwardness in its utterly infinite wealth", for Socrates it has a starker meaning:
"separate yourself from the other" (ibid.). This connects with Kierkegaard's ostensibly audacious claim that the self did not exist prior to Socrates (ibid.). How so?
First, on the question of Socrates' private daimon, Kierkegaard sides with Plato's view that the daimon only warns Socrates against doing certain things, as opposed to Xenophon's view that the daimon also urged him to positive actions. Ultimately Socrates' negativity inheres in his characteristic irony ("infinite absolute negativity", to borrow Hegel's phrase). Socrates is requires one continually to realise this freedom in action; "He who has chosen himself on this basis is eo ipso one who acts" (EO II 232/SKS3 222).
In that same letter, the Judge presents self-knowledge as key to the difference between the "aesthetic" and "ethical" modes of life. The ethical individual's being transparent to himself "encompasses everything":
The person who lives ethically has seen himself, knows himself, penetrates his whole concretion with his consciousness, does not allow vague thoughts to rustle around inside him or let tempting possibilities distract him with their juggling; he is not like a "magic" picture that shifts from one thing to another, all depending upon how one shifts and turns it. He knows himself. The phrase know yourself is a stock phrase, and in it has been perceived the goal of all a person's striving. And this is entirely proper, but yet it is just as certain that it cannot be the goal if it is not also the beginning. The ethical individual knows himself, but this knowing is not simply contemplation, for then the individual comes to be defined according to his necessity. It is a collecting of oneself, which itself is an action, and this is why I have with aforethought used the expression "to choose oneself" instead of "to know oneself". (EO II 258/SKS3 246) So what matters most about self-knowledge is that it is a crucial precursor to the development of an "authentic" individual. But it is important to note here that by "choosing oneself" Judge William has in mind something very different from radical choice à la Sartre. Elsewhere he qualifies this by replacing talk of "choosing" oneself with "receiving" oneself (EO II 177/SKS3 172) -that is, willing receptivity; recognising what are, and are not, serious possibilities for you. Here, the active striving will is complemented -indeed, to some extent replaced -by a more passive recognition of value that breaks through, requiring our acknowledgment. 6 In working out the implications of this, there is an important interplay between possibility and necessity, and between first-and third-person perspectives which we shall need to explore in more detail.
4) Self-knowledge: first-or third-personal? The problem of sin and dependence upon God
Is "Socratic" self-knowledge essentially first-personal, or does third-personal knowledge of human properties also count? I shall argue that for Kierkegaard, we need both: despite his association with slogans such as "truth is subjectivity", it is not just the former. Later, I shall suggest how he tries to hold both together, in such a way that there is also a crucial secondperson aspect in how we are to relate to God. Elsewhere, however, our "absolute need of God" is presented as a pre-requisite for selfknowledge (or whatever self-knowledge we may have (JP1: 53/Pap. V B 196)). We might relate this emphasis on God-dependence to the famous formula of The Sickness Unto Death (1848), Kierkegaard's major discussion of despair: "The formula that describes the condition of the self when despair is completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it" (SUD 14/SKS11 130, my emphasis). This "resting transparently" is a manifestation of selfknowledge insofar as the self knows what it owes to God, but experiences this not as guilt and debt but gratitude for the forgiveness of sins. 9 Here we start to see the importance of a second-person God-relationship.
Kierkegaard tackles this question obliquely in
Sickness is indeed a text that highlights the difficulty of self-knowledge. The varieties of despair that the author Anti-Climacus portrays are often forms of self-deception in which we wilfully resist the self-transparency Judge William emphasized. Anti-Climacus makes the striking claim that despair is a universal human phenomenon . He
anticipates that this claim is likely to seem overblown, and suggests that the reason for this is our tendency to overlook that "not being conscious of being in despair, is precisely a form of despair" (SUD 23/SKS11 139). Just as the physician knows that there can be purely imaginary forms of health as well as of sickness, so the "physician of the soul" recognises this is also true of spiritual ill-health. 9 Sickness describes the forgiveness of sins as the crucial difference between Christianity and paganism (SUD 117/SKS11 228).
10 In this sense, for Kierkegaard, ethical and religious knowledge has a particular claim to be called self-knowledge (cf. Watts, "Self-Knowledge", 538).
The fantastic is generally that which leads a person out into the infinite in such a way that it only leads him away from himself and thereby prevents him from coming back to himself (SUD 31/SKS11 147).
Anti-Climacus then briefly illustrates this through three such forms of the fantastic -feeling;
knowing; and willing -through each of which the self becomes weakened or "volatilized"
[forflygtiges] and thus "lost". Fantastic feeling replaces a genuine concern for a concrete other with "a kind of abstract sentimentality that inhumanly belongs to no human being" (ibid.). Fantastic willing fails to ally its lofty ambitions with the small part of its grand task that can be accomplished "this very day, this very hour, this very moment" (SUD 32/SKS11 148). What then of fantastic knowing? Here Anti-Climacus claims:
The law for the development of the self with respect to knowing, insofar as it is the case that the self becomes itself, is that the increase of knowledge corresponds to the increase of self-knowledge, that the more the self knows, the more it knows itself. If this does not happen, the more knowledge increases, the more it becomes a kind of inhuman knowledge, in the obtaining of which a person's self is squandered, much the way men were squandered on building pyramids (SUD 31/SKS11 147).
In other words, Anti-Climacus is warning against the valorisation of knowledge abstracted from the concrete concerns of living that Kierkegaard often associates with speculative philosophy. Down that route lies a kind of comical self-forgetfulness to which Kierkegaard seems to think the intellectual is particularly prone. Behind his various satires about losing oneself is a familiar question. What shall it profit a man, he effectively asks, if he shall gain the whole world -of knowledge -and yet lose his own soul? 11 Here as elsewhere,
Kierkegaard privileges "essential" knowledge. A major concern in Sickness is the loss of the self in abstraction which Anti-Climacus considers to be a variety of despair (SUD 32/SKS11 148). Yet such a loss of the self -or failure to rise to the task of becoming a self -is presented there as entirely normal:
a self is the last thing the world cares about and the most dangerous thing of all for a person to show signs of having. The greatest hazard of all, losing the self, can occur very quietly in the world, as if it were nothing at all. No other loss can occur so quietly;
any other loss -an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. -is sure to be noticed (SUD 32-3/SKS11 148).
Passages such as this have been used in support of reading Kierkegaard as a protoexistentialist, concerned about the inauthenticity of das Man (Kierkegaard's roughly equivalent term for which is the "public" 12 )
. And yet there is a specifically Christian dimension to this, as we shall shortly see.
Anti-Climacus briefly returns to the question of self-knowledge a little later, in the guise of the importance of having (in an echo of the Judge) "clarity about oneself" (SUD 47/SKS11 162). He defers to later discussion an important question, namely whether it is possible simultaneously to have such self-clarity and yet still be in despair. In doing so, he also defers discussion of the possibility that such clarity of self-knowledge might "simply wrench a person out of despair, make him so afraid of himself that he would stop being in despair" (ibid.). In other words, could self-knowledge be a cure for despair? Frustratingly, this refers to a section D, contemplated but never written, which was excluded from the final version of the manuscript. Christianity and the "purely human point of view" can agree that self-ignorance and selfmisunderstanding are like forms of intoxication (JY 104/SKS16 161). But they disagree on what it means "to come to oneself in self-knowledge" (JY 105/SKS16 161). Kierkegaard compares the "objective knowing" at which speculative philosophy aims to spiritual dizziness. As in the Postscript, objective knowing is presented as occasioning a selfforgetfulness that is the very opposite of the self-knowledge that sobriety requires.
For Kierkegaard, only the self-knowledge that leads to knowing oneself "before God" is selfknowledge of the right sort. Extending the earlier references to self-transparency, the claim is now explicitly that the transparency of sobriety is only possible before God. In the same way as the expert lash of the royal coachman brings his horse up short, forcing a realisation of who is boss, so God, without whom I am nothing, brings home to me "the unconditioned"
[ (ibid.): and "immediately" (JY 120/SKS16 175). This is true sobriety.
An associated journal entry from 1851 gives one of Kierkegaard's clearest statements on how he understands the ideal of self-knowledge. The topic is "What is Required in Order to Look at Oneself with True Blessing in the Mirror of the Word" (JP4: 3902/Pap. X4 A 412). 16 Here he suggests that a certain degree of self-knowledge is necessary in order for the self- 14 In their introduction to their collection of Kierkegaard's writings from the last two years of his life, the Hongs suggest that ultimately for Kierkegaard "Self-knowledge comes through imitating [Christ] , and spiritual progress becomes retrogression in the light of the ideal requirement" (M xii). This is in line with the idea expressed as early as the sermon at the end of Either/Or, that in relation to God we are always "in the wrong". But it means, controversially, that there is a kind of self-knowledge that is only available to the Christian.
15 I assume the warning here is about "fantastic" knowing, as discussed above. Only "before God" can I truly see myself -the mirror provides a continual "Thou art the man" (FSE 35-40/SKS13 62-6) -and any self-knowledge that falls short of this revelation is a "fraud" (JP4: 3902/Pap. X4 A 412).
17
To clarify: the primary meaning of "the Word" here means scripture (not God qua logos),
18
while "God-knowledge" means not "objective" third-person knowledge of the divine, but an essentially two-way second-person "God-relationship" in which God loves his creatures, who in turn stand "before God" in faith. The focus is more on "knowing God" in a relational sense than on knowing about God.
We should also note how Kierkegaard cashes out the need for this ruthless self-examination.
Although he concludes the journal entry by emphasising the importance of "an implacable hatred for the self that the mirror shows as being that to which one should die" (ibid.), we
should not miss the preceding passage, in which two kinds of error are stressed. In wanting only the truth, one should "neither vainly wish to be flattered nor self-tormentingly want to be made a pure devil". This second error is just as important as the first: for all his focus on sin, Kierkegaard is at least as concerned with the forgiveness of sins and its link to selfforgiveness, 19 a topic with which he wrestled, on a deeply personal level, for most of his life.
That the God before whom we stand is a God of love who forgives our sins is for Kierkegaard the ultimate good news. There is a dialectic at work in self-knowledge analogous to that in self-love, Kierkegaard being concerned to tease out the difference between proper and improper forms of the latter. Just as I must come in a certain sense to hate myself in order to be able to love the version of myself I should love, so I need to recognise the limits of what I can naturally know about myself in order that true self-knowledge may (at least to an extent) be possible: by looking at myself in the Mirror of the Word.
This allows us finally to return to the question of whether we should understand selfknowledge in first-or third-personal terms -and how this also involves a second-person element. We are now better placed to see how Kierkegaard is trying to combine these factors. 20 While rejecting the third person ("German") view, it is misleading to see him as committed to the single, isolated subject being the sole defining locus of selfhood. There are plenty of instances where Kierkegaard sounds like he is signed up to this picture (not least in the slogan "truth is subjectivity"), but it is now increasingly recognised that he intends for this to serve as a corrective to a misapplied objectivity of the kind associated with speculative philosophy: a rescuing of the particular from the universal; of individual being from thought (see CA 78n/SKS4 381). The subjective thinker's task is to understand himself -including (though not limited to) the sheer givenness of such "universal" aspects as his creaturelinessin his concrete, particular existence. "No true self-knowledge without God-knowledge": the journal passage is one of many in which Kierkegaard seeks to combine first, second and third personal aspects as outlined above. This is, then, also how we should understand his remark that self-knowledge should be understood "in the Greek way, and then again as the Greeks would have understood it if they had possessed Christian presuppositions" (CA 79/SKS4 382). As we have seen, the concept the Greeks lacked is sin. I need to understand sin as an objective property in which all humanity is implicated, 21 but to relate to this on a first-person, subjective level as something that applies to me. Standing "before God" (second-person) is what brings this home. The focus on the phenomenology of feelings and moods that
Kierkegaard undertakes in his works on anxiety and despair highlight this subjective dimension (and there is a lengthy discussion of "subjective anxiety"), but these are meant to be universal claims about the human condition. 22 One of the uses of anxiety, it emerges in the final chapter of The Concept of Anxiety, is the insight it gives us into our own guilt.
Haufniensis' claim that "if a man is guilty, he is infinitely guilty" (CA 161/SKS4 460) means that no guilty person can make himself once again innocent. What this highlights is the need for an external forgiver of sins: the ability to forgive sins is a "chasmal qualitative abyss" between God and man (SUD 122/SKS11 233). I need to know -third-personally -that sins can be forgiven, but also to grasp -first-personally -that this applies to me. As Kierkegaard seems to have experienced first-hand, this move is far from automatic, but -he thinks -it is a gift of grace. 23 Ultimately, then, from Kierkegaard's Christian point of view, a key part of self-knowledge is to experience myself as a sinner whose sins have been forgiven. What
Climacus would call "old fashioned orthodoxy" is for Kierkegaard both the deepest form of self-knowledge, and the most valuable gift of grace.
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